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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
Full Faith and Credit
The sweeping language of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal
Constitution29 has been made the subject of a number of exceptions and the
exact scope of the concept is still uncertain.30 One of the traditional exceptions
is the doctrine that a foreign judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the
person or the subject matter will not be honored when sued upon in a sister
state. The basis of this rule is, of course, the requirement of due process of
law, as such a judgment is void even in the state which gave judgment.
When a New Jersey judgment 3' dealing with a fraudulent sale of two bridges
by a syndicate to a county bridge commission was brought into the New York
Courts for enforcement,32 the defendants opposed a motion for summary judgment
against them by relying on another claimed due process execption to the require-
ment of full faith and credit. They argued that the New Jersey court had ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction in granting a form of relief different from that prayed for
in the complaint thus depriving them of the kind of notice guaranteed them
by the Constitution. The exact error alleged was that though the plaintiff had
demanded rescission of the fraudulently induced contract, the Court had refused
rescission, affirmed title to the bridge in the commission and decreed that the
profits of the defendant be turned over to the plaintiff. In this way, the court
was able to protect some bona fide purchasers of a bond issue made by the bridge
commission. This, the defendants claimed, was as much a denial of due process
as the imposition of a jail sentence in a civil action for money damages.
The court held that there was no denial of due process. The judgment
rendered was "substantially responsive to the issues presented by the pleadings,"
which is the test set up by the Supreme Court.33 Nor was there any necessity
to discuss the defendant's argument based on alleged inconsistencies between the
findings and the decree. The full faith and credit clause "precludes any inquiry
into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision,
or the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment is based."34 It is
then the allegations in the complaint, rather than the findings, which determines
29. U. S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
30. See, e.g. W. L. M. Reese and V. A. Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and
Credit to Judgments, 49 COL. L. REV. 153 (1949), B. MacChesney, Full Faith and
Credit-A Comparative Study 44 ILL. L. REV. 298 (1949-50), for discussions of recent
developments.
31. Driscoll v. Burlington-Bri-stol Bridge Co. 8 N. J. 453, 86 A 2d 201 (1952).
32. Connolley v. Bell, 309 N. Y. 581, 132 N. E. 2d 582 (1956).
33. Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254 (1891). See also N. Y. Civ. PtAc. ACr
§111, allowing amendments at any stage to correct mistakes in the remedy re-
quested.
34. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 (1940).
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the jurisdiction of the court so far as the kind of relief which may be granted
without offending due process is concerned.
35
Public Utilities-New Element in Rafe-Fixing
For many years the Supreme Court had held that in determining reasonable
rates upon the fair value of a utility's property used in public service, various
factors must be taken into consideration, including reproduction value and original
cost.3 6 This remained the law until 1944 when the court virtually reversed it-
self, holding that the Constitution did not mandate consideration of any specific
factor in rate-fixing, provided the rate fixed be just and reasonable.
37
The Public Service Commission Law, under which the Commission operates,
requires that the rates of public utilities be based upon the value of the property
actually used by the utility.3 8  In setting utility rates, the first step is establishing
the rate base; then the rate of return is set by looking at tradition and by examin-
ing the capital market; applying the rate of return to the rate base gives the
amount of return; utility rates are set so as to yield this amount.30 The initial
task then is to determine the appropriate rate base. The conflict in this area comes
from those who urge that "original cost" be used as the base and those who prefer
that "reproduction cost" be the base. Until the present time, the Commission has
steadfastly refused to use anything but "original cost" as their base in setting rates,
attempting to keep the base low and making any adjustments which are deemed
necessary in the rate of return.40 The utilites, on the other hand, have maintained
that using "original cost" basis does not allow for inflation in plant and equip-
ment prices. Thus the utilities aim for a high base, hoping that the rate of re-
turn will remain commensurately high, allowing for the imposition of higher
rates and yielding higher earnings to the utility.
In the instant case,41 the utility contended, and the Court of Appeals upheld
35. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270 (1912).
36. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
37. Federal Power Com'n. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
38. N. Y. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION LAW §97 The Commission shall, with
due regard, among other things to a reasonable average return upon the value
of the property actually used in the public service and to the necessity of making
reservation out of the income for surplus and contingencies, determine the just
and reasonable rates.
39. Somers, Cost of Money as the Determinant of Public Utility Rates, 4
BUFFALO L. REV. 289, 309 (1955).
40. Case No. 15235 Re: New York Telephone Co., N. Y. P. S. C., Separate
Print p. 48, 49 (1951).
41. N. Y. Telephone Co. v. P. S. C., 309 N. Y. 569, 132 N. E. 2d 847 (1956).
The telephone company brought an Article 78 proceeding (sections 1283 et seq.
of the Civil Practice Act). The Appellate Division annulled the Commission's
action and the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision.
